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THE UNREALIZED EXPECTATIONS OF
ARTICLE I, SECTION 17
ELMER GERTZ*

Illinois was the last large northern industrial state to enact
a fair employment practices law, and it has never passed open
housing legislation, despite strenuous efforts by its proponents.
Therefore, it is surprising, indeed, that the Illinois Constitution
of 1970 contains the strongest nondiscrimination provisions of any
state constitution.
Three specific provisions in the Bill of Rights combine to prohibit the major part of both public and private discrimination in
Illinois, but each is worded differently and each has a different
purpose and impact. Article I, section 181 expands the general
guarantee of equal protection of the laws contained in article I,
section 22 to prohibit discrimination by the state and local governments on the basis of sex. Article I, section 193 guarantees
physically and mentally handicapped persons freedom from discrimination in housing and from discrimination unrelated to ability in employment. However, the most important of the antidiscrimination provisions is article I, section 17, which reads:
All persons shall have the right to be free from discrimination on the basis of race, color, creed, national ancestry and sex
in the hiring and promotion practices of any employer or in the
sale or rental of property.
These rights are enforceable without action by the General
Assembly, but the General Assembly by law may establish reasonable exemptions relating to4 these rights and provide additional remedies for their violation.
* Elmer Gertz was the Chairman of the Bill of Rights Committee
at the Sixth Illinois Constitutional Convention and is on the faculty of
The John Marshall Law School, where he conducts seminars on civil
rights and on privacy. He is the author of books, pamphlets and articles
on civil rights. Professor Gertz gratefully acknowledges the indispensable assistance of his research assistants, Stewart Weltman and Lloyd
Hammonds.
1. ILL. CONST. art. I, § 18: "The equal protection of the laws shall
not be denied or abridged on account of sex by the State or its units
of local government and school districts."
2. Id. § 2:

"No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property

without due process of law nor be denied the equal protection of the

laws."

3. Id. § 19: "All persons with a physical or mental handicap shall
be free from discrimination in the sale or rental of property and shall
be free from discrimination unrelated to ability in the hiring and promotion practices of any employer."
4. Id. § 17.
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It is the purpose of this article to analyze this provision and
to tell how it came about, what it portends, and why, despite the
high expectations for it, it has been little used so far. The article
concludes with an analysis of a recent important case involving
section 17.

5

FAIR HOUSING AND FAIR EMPLOYMENT IN ILLINOIS BEFORE

1969

Although it prides itself upon being "the land of Lincoln,"
Illinois did not pass a fair employment practices law until 1961.6
Through unique circumstances, I played a special role in its passage. During my tenure as president of the Greater Chicago
Council of the American Jewish Congress, I urged that we give
a special award to Bell & Howell and its then president, Charles
H. Percy, ostensibly for their courage in sponsoring a series of
enlightened television programs. Eventually I prevailed. Primarily because of a conversation I had with Mr. (now Senator)
Percy at this award ceremony, the Fair Employment Practices Act
7
(FEPA) was passed.
However, from its inception, the FEPA was beset with problems. The General Assembly continually emasculated any potential effectiveness of the Act." Delays and frustrations were built
5. Davis v. Attic Club, No. 73 L. 18515 (Cook Cnty. Cir. Ct., June
18, 1975), aff'd, 371 N.E.2d 903 (1977); see notes 117-62 infra.
6. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 48, §§ 851-867 (1975).
7. See E. GErTZ, To Lm 103-04 (1974):
I had in mind more than praise for good works. The Congress,
in league with similar organizations, had been giving leadership for
years to a drive to persuade the Illinois General Assembly to pass
fair employment practices legislation. We repeatedly failed because
we could not pressure any Republican legislators, other than black
ones, to join us. It was my plan to seize upon the award luncheon
as an opportunity to persuade Percy to obtain the necessary Republican votes. I found him a bright, far-seeing, and charming man,
and I had no difficulty in firing him with the ambition to deliver
enough votes to assure passage of our bill. 'There won't be many
votes from my Party' he said, 'but I promise enough to turn the tide.'
And he kept his word and Illinois, at last, had some sort of F.E.P.C.,
not as good as we wanted, but good enough to start.
My experience with Percy, who later became a distinguished
United States Senator, illustrated for me the fortuitous nature of
much accomplishment. A budget, a staff, persistent lobbying, much
public support produced no F.E.P.C. A conversation with a man on
the way up was the magical element that brought about success.
8. The General Assembly sniped at all those who would make such
legislation effective. The Governor named two extremely well-qualified
persons to be members of the enforcement commission: Earl B. Dickerson, one of the outstanding black leaders of the nation, a former alderman, a former assistant Attorney General and an insurance company
president; and Ralph Helstein, a lawyer of great ability and the president
of the packinghouse workers union. The senatorial committee subjected
both men to a cruel inquisition and then rejected them, ostensibly because of their outspoken views, but more likely because they would have
taken their duties seriously. With Dickerson and Helstein in the lead,
the commission would have gotten off to an effective start. Charles
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into the administration of the law. From time to time the law was
amended to place more people under it, but it was excessively
difficult to get money for enforcement purposes.
The Motorola case is illustrative. In Motorola, Inc. v. Illinois
Fair Employment Practices Commission9 the Illinois Supreme
Court sustained the constitutionality of the FEPA, 10 which
created the Fair Employment Practices Commission (FEPC).
The FEPC had found that Motorola had falsely recorded the
examination of a black job applicant in order to avoid hiring
him. Instead of acquiescing in the FEPC ruling, Motorola
fought it all the way to the Illinois Supreme Court and ultimately lost. Although it was undoubtedly the company's right to
contest this FEPC ruling, it illustrates industry's general hostility
and dilatory actions directed against the enforcement of the
FEPA. The combination of a reluctant General Assembly and an
antagonistic industry had greatly diminished the effectiveness of
the FEPA.
However, the FEPA was not the only nondiscrimination statute in Illinois. Earlier, in 1885, the Illinois General Assembly
passed a statute making it a crime to discriminate on the basis
of race, religion, color or national ancestry in the use of public
accommodations.'1 It covered restaurants, hotels and most other
public places. Moreover, by 1969 the United States Congress had
12
also enacted laws prohibiting discrimination in employment,
1
4
In addition, there was
housing,'3 and public accommodations.
the fourteenth amendment of the U.S. Constitution, which had
been expressly created to wipe out discrimination. Why, then,
was it necessary to consider the advisability of a state constituGray, a respectable white businessman, was more to the legislature's liking, but as soon as he tried to do an honest job, he fared no better than
Dickerson and Helstein would have fared.
9. 34 Ill. 2d 266, 215 N.E.2d 286 (1966).
10. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 48, §§ 851-867 (1975).
11. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, §§ 13-1 & 13-2 (1975). In 1971 the legislature added "physical or mental handicaps" to the list of impermissible
bases for discrimination, thereby providing a statutory remedy for a violation of article I, section 19. So far it has not added "sex" to the list,
despite the existence of article I, section 18. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 131 (1975), defines "public accommodations" as including:
inns, restaurants, eating houses, hotels, soda fountains, soft drink
parlors, taverns, roadhouses, barbershops, department stores, clothing stores, hat stores, shoe stores, bathrooms, restrooms, theatres,
skating rinks, public golf courses, public golf driving ranges, concerts, cafes, bicycle rinks, elevators, ice cream parlors or rooms, railroads, omni-busses, busses, stages, airplanes, street cars, boats, funeral hearses, crematories, cemeteries, and public conveyances on
land, water, or air, public swimming pools and other places of public
accommodation and amusement.
12. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, e-l to e-17 (1970).
13. Id.§§ 3601-3607 (1970).
14. Id.§ 2000a, a-1 to a-6 (1970).
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tional provision? First, the Federal Constitution does not extend
to discrimination committed by private individuals; nor do the
federal statutes extend to discrimination outside of interstate
commerce. 15 Second, the scope of the Illinois Fair Employment
Practices Act was too limited as to the kinds of discrimination
involved and remedies available; 16 there could be no money damages, and the exemptions, such as the exemption of employers
of fewer than 25 people, 1 7 tended to vitiate the effect of the law.
Third, enforcement of the penal statute on discrimination in public accommodations was difficult and erratic. Finally, there was
no statewide law in Illinois with respect to discrimination in
housing or, indeed, any other kind of property. 18 Having once
embarked upon a course of deterring discrimination, it was unlikely that the advocates of nondiscrimination would be content
to let the matter rest.
THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION
The Sixth Illinois Constitutional Convention of 1969-70 was
a gigantic step toward achieving genuine freedom from discrimination. Fortunately, the enabling legislation required the nonpartisan election of delegates to the convention. 9 This meant
that in both the primary and final elections no party labels would
be attached to the candidates, even if, in fact, they had been selected or approved by either the Republican or Democratic organization. Thus, enough independent liberals were elected to
make a vast difference in the deliberations of the convention. In
addition, many of the party winners were well-meaning, "good
government" people, not as hidebound as many of the legislators
who had been hostile to the strengthening of the FEPA and completely opposed to open housing legislation.
The delegates, either on their own or at the behest of civic
groups, introduced "member proposals," which were suggested
provisions for the new constitution, similar to bills in the legislature. The proposals were sent by the president of the convention
to the appropriate committees for consideration as they heard
testimony and deliberated on the articles that they would present
to the convention. The committees could originate proposals of
their own and modify or reject any proposals submitted to them
by the president.
15. See notes 63-70 and accompanying text infra.
16. See notes 95-116 and accompanying text infra.
17. ILL.

REV. STAT.

ch. 48, § 852(d) (1975).

18. The legislature had only passed a law enabling municipalities to
regulate real estate brokers. See note 75 and accompanying text infra.
19. Act of 1969, Pub. Act No. 76-40, § 5, 1969 ll. Laws 58.
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Several proposals assigned to the Committee on the Bill of
Rights concerned discrimination. One proposal, inspired by a
provision in the Michigan Bill of Rights, guaranteed that no person would be denied the enjoyment of, or be discriminated
against in the exercise of, his "civil or political rights. ' 20 Another
stated that "the right of the people to education, employment,
housing, voluntary association and political participation" should
not be infringed on the basis of race, creed, color, national origin
or sex. 21 These and other proposals left uncertainty as to the
meaning of the term "rights," and especially as to whether they
applied to discrimination in the private sector as well as the pub22
lic sector.
By rare good fortune, I had been named Chairman of the convention's important Bill of Rights Committee by President Samuel W. Witwer. This was a personal triumph, but, more significantly, it gave impetus and leadership to the fight for suitable
nondiscrimination provisions. I tried from the beginning to win
converts, particularly among the conservative members of the
committee. One person whom I especially courted was Lewis D.
Wilson, a delegate from Moline. He was a "gray haired, courtly,
conservative, informed and unflappable lawyer and businessman."' 23 He had been active in the Goldwater presidential campaign, and some thought he would have made an ideal chairman
of the committee to keep it from the control of the liberals. He
was the retired general counsel and vice-president of John Deere
and Company, a one-time director and vice-president of the state
Chamber of Commerce, a long-time trustee of the Taxpayers Federation, and a member of the Board of Governors of the United
Republican Fund. I was determined to win him over to the nondiscrimination cause and courted him assiduously. During one
of the first days of the convention, Mr. Wilson and I took a long
walk, during the course of which we discussed nondiscrimination
in employment. Wilson said that he favored it in the public sector-and had no objection to a constitutional provision in that area,
but he was opposed to such a provision in the private sector. He
thought that this was an area for voluntary action, rather than
any constitutional edict.
20. 7 RECORD

OF PROCEEDINGS, SIXTH ILL. CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION,

at 2941 (1969-70) [hereinafter cited as PROCEEDINGS].
21. Id. at 2876.
22. For the texts of the other proposals see id. at 2879, 3043.

The

committee rejected some proposals that were sufficiently definite but of
possibly limited appeal, such as one forbidding discrimination against
persons who had been arrested absent subsequent conviction. See id. at
2966. See also E. GERTZ, FOR THE FIRST HOURS OF TOMORROW: THE Nxw
ILLINOIS BILL OF RIGHTS 103-04 (1972) [hereinafter cited as GERTz].
23. GERTZ, supra note 22, at 23.
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I persisted. The committee had received several skillfully
drafted proposals for revision of the Bill of Rights from the Welfare Council of Metropolitan Chicago. One called for a revision
of Illinois' due process clause, 24 to which they had added the
words:
No person shall be subject to any discrimination in his rights for
or in employment, housing, public accommodation or public education, or in any other of his inherent and inalienable rights because of race, color, religion, national ancestry, sex, or physical
or mental disability, by any individual or by any firm, corporaor by the state or any agency or subdivision
tion, or institution,
25
of the state.
Satisfied that I was committed to its general aims, I translated
the Welfare Council proposal into my own member proposal and
submitted it to the convention. 2 6 Other delegates soon submitted
27
other proposals to ban discrimination in one form or another
28
and then Lewis Wilson came forth with his proposal, ultimately
the one adopted by the committee, and, with only changes in
style, by the full convention and the people of Illinois. Mr. Wilson had come to believe in nondiscrimination in the private sector
as well a the public, a notable shift in viewpoint. Other organizations lent support to the movement for nondiscrimination as
well. Apparently, its time had come, and we seized upon the opportunity.
Although with respect to discrimination by government, the
provision may have simply supplemented the existing state equal
protection clause, with respect to discrimination by private persons, it created important new rights. Our committee report
summarized the weeks of controversy, argument and hearings on
the various antidiscrimination proposals:
The Committee finally concluded that there should be a constitutional provision forbidding discrimination, and that the provi24. ILL. CONST. art. I, § 2 (1870).
25. See GERz, supra note 22, at 63 for a fuller discussion of this suggestion.
26. 7 PROCEEDINGS, supra note 20, at 2934. I had ten cosponsors, including another member of the Bill of Rights Committee, Virginia B.
Macdonald.
27. See id. at 2876, 2878-79, 2879, 3043.
28. The proposal was originally designated section 22 of the Bill of
Rights and read:
Every person shall have a right to freedom from discrimination
on the basis of race, color, creed, national ancestry or sex in the hiring and promotion practices of any employer or in the sale or rental
of property.
These rights shall be enforceable without action by the General
Assembly, but the General Assembly may establish reasonable exemptions relating to these rights and may prescribe additional remedies for the violation of these rights.
6 id. at 12. For the text of the section as enacted see text accompanying
note 4 supra.
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sion should be specifically directed at and limited to the important areas of employment and the sale or rental of property. The
Committee resolved that the time had arrived when all persons
subject to the laws of the State of Illinois should enjoy a constitutional right to freedom from discrimination by private
persons
29
as well as by public agencies in these important areas.
In addition to a discussion of the application of the provision
to the private sector, the report dealt with the kinds of reasonable
exemptions that might be established by the legislature. 0 For
example, few could disapprove of the indirect discrimination involved in providing housing for "the aged members of certain
religious or ethnic organizations, or women's groups."3' 1 The
report suggested that there might also be permitted some discrimination in "employment or rental relationships that are on so
small a scale and under circumstances so intimate that they are
of a highly personal nature, '3 2 but it did not give examples.
The report dealt almost summarily with the declared selfenforcing nature of the provision, the obvious legislative power
to provide additional remedies for victims of discrimination, and
the lack of legislative power to impair existing remedies.3 3 Finally, the report defined "rentals" as "leaseholds and all other
arrangements by which the possession or use of property is exchanged for a valuable consideration. '34 Somewhat cryptically,
it added that "property" meant "all property," 35 apparently intending the term to include anything that might be considered
as property, without limitation. When one compares the committee proposal with the provisions in other state constitutions, one
realizes that none is as far-reaching as that of Illinois.
Naturally I selected Lewis Wilson, our new and highly respectable convert, to lead the floor fight in favor of our nondiscrimination provision. There really was no fight. On first3 6 and
later87 readings, the provision was approved overwhelmingly.
We had thought that there might be strenuous opposition to the
proposed constitution because of our nondiscrimination provision
29. 6 PROCEEDINGS, supra note 20, at 68.

30. See GERTZ, supra note 22, at 102 for a more detailed discussion of
the committee report.

31. 6 PROCEEDINGS, supra note 20, at 68. See note 116 infra.
32. 6 PROCEEDINGS, supra note 20, at 69.

33. "Since the right is explicitly made 'enforceable without action by
the General Assembly', an aggrieved person could have recourse to existing judicial or legislative remedies for a violation of the right. The Gen-

eral Assembly is also authorized to prescribe additional remedies."
34. Id. at 70.
35. Id. See notes 125-34 and accompanying text infra.
36. The vote on first reading was Aye-90, Nay-6. 3
supra note 20, at 1613.

Id.

PROCEEDINGS,

37. The vote on second reading was a voice vote on the entire article.
4 id. at 3634. The vote on third reading was also on the entire Bill of
Rights, and was Aye-88, Nay-l, and Pass-14. 5 id. at 4281.
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and the two that were added on the floor of the convention (sec-

tion 18, barring discrimination on the basis of sex, and section 19,
barring discrimination against the handicapped).38 Yet little opposition developed on the part of the electorate.
The Debates

Some of the discussion at the convention is worth recalling
to arrive at our meaning and to illuminate the nature of some
of the questions propounded to us by the delegates. I wanted
to get the floor discussion off to a start on the highest possible
level before turning over the floor leadership to Lewis Wilson.
Alas, the alleged transcript of my remarks was so badly garbled
as to make little sense. I began by reminding my fellow delegates that we were debating nondiscrimination in the very chamber where, more than a century before, Abraham Lincoln had delivered his historic "House Divided" speech in which he had so
eloquently depicted the dilemmas before a nation that was half
slave and half free. I concluded, "[d] iscrimination is the slavery
of our day. We must end it before it kills us, as slavery almost
39

did.",

Then Delegate Wilson took over. Patiently, he explained
every aspect of the nondiscrimination section, emphasizing one
point of special importance:
The job of a bill of rights always is a job of balancing and
trying to evaluate competing interests. Sometimes these are the
interests of one private citizen versus the interests of another
private citizen. Sometimes it's the balancing of the rights of an
individual
citizen against society or against all of us collective40
ly.

He then summed up the rationale for the position that we were
taking:
Why do we have such a provision? I think the answer is
really a pretty simple one. I think the majority of the committee felt that the right to be free from discrimination because you
are black or because you are an Oriental or because you are a
Catholic or because you are a Jew or because of any of those
things, is pretty fundamental. We feel that it's on the same
plane with the other basic rights guaranteed by the constitution
-freedom of speech, freedom to assemble, freedom to worship,
due process of law. It seems to us that in the year 1970 that the
right to be free from discrimination because you have a different
color or a different religion or a different national ancestry are
38. See 5 id. at 3669 (introduction of § 18); id. at 3678 (introduction of
§ 19). For the text of the two sections respectively see notes 1 & 3

supra.

39. 3 PROCEEDINGS, supra note 20, at 1592.
40. Id. at 1592-93.
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very, very basic4 1rights and are eminently properly included in
the constitution.
These were eloquent, moving words from a man who had
once opposed prohibition of private discrimination. Yet each
delegate had his own strong reasons for supporting the proposal.
While some believed that it was a matter of simple justice, an
idea whose time had come, for others there were very practical
economic considerations. The Vice-Chairman of the Bill of
Rights Committee, James Kemp, a black man of much shrewdness and vigor, long a trade union leader, and member of the Illinois Fair Employment Practices Commission, gave what was for
many the basic reason for nondiscrimination:
I believe that I now know what it takes to heal the wounds
of Gilead. It is a poultice, green in color, freely transferable in
the market of commerce, varying in value depending on figures
printed on its face; it is commonly known as money. As a practicing trade unionist of thirty years' experience, this delegate has
observed a healthy respect for that item, both in the employer
and employee community. It often appears to transcend race,
religion, rank, or serial number. It forms up friendships, creates
vendettas, and-when properly distributed by agreement of the
parties-provides lasting and sympathetic understandings. It is
such a common denominator that all citizens are keenly aware
of its existence and seeming importance. It is then in this context that this delegate will attempt to address you and hopefully
persuade 42you and your constituents voting support [sic] of this
proposal.
Delegates then proceeded to question Delegate Wilson about
various aspects of our proposal. A Republican from a Chicago
suburb asked why the committee had limited the scope of the
provision to the "sale or rental of property" and "the hiring and
promotion practices of any employer. ' 48 Mr. Wilson explained
that these two fields were "the worst areas of discrimination" and
that prohibitions of discrimination in these two areas would be
most acceptable to the public, which would later vote to adopt
44
or reject the constitution.
Delegates also asked for clarifications of definitions of key
terms. Questions by Delegate Connor, a banker from Peoria,
helped develop the meaning of some of the terms used:
MR. CONNOR: What does employment mean? Is hiringMR. WILSON: It certainly means hiring. It certainly means
-to me, at least-it means the treatment that the employee
gets after he is hired, the condition under41. Id. at 1593.
42. Id. at 1594.
43. Id. at 1595 (the question was posed by Delegate Thomas E.
Miller).
44. Id. at 1595.
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MR.
MR.
cetera?
MR.
4
yes. 6
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CONNOR: Does it include separation?
WILSON: What's that?
CONNOR: Does it include separation, lay-offs, et
WILSON:

I would certainly think so, Mr. Connor,

Along the same line, Delegate Meek, who had long been a

lobbyist for the Illinois Retail Merchants Association, asked if

"employment and hiring practices" included an employer's "demotion" of an employee. Delegate Wilson could give no reason
why the committee had not been that specific in its wording and
Delegate Meek withdrew the question. 46 There seems no doubt
that "demotions" are covered, as are, indeed, all 'employment
practices.
One of the most important words in the section is "property,"
a term which had not been defined precisely in the committee
report. Delegate Jaskula of Chicago asked if the term, which he
said was normally used to describe the "real property" involved
in housing discrimination, also included "personal property."
Delegate Wilson's reply and the ensuing exchange are important:
MR. WILSON: The word, Mr. Jaskula, is 'property', and I
assume that it would include personal property. However, I
think the real rub comes in real estate which is not movable, of
course. I-we didn't-I must say that I recall that we heard no
testimony about discrimination in the sale of portable propertyproperty that people can take and move around.
MR. JASKULA: But you do intend to include the personal
property also. Is that correct?
MR. WILSON: The term is broad enough to include personal property, yes sir. 47
The two aspects of the provision that generated the most
questions were the power given the legislature to grant "reasonable exemptions" to the antidiscrimination provisions and the
self-enforcing nature of the right. The committee report had
made it clear that any legislative exemptions must be "reasonable" and could not "undermine the substance of the right to
45. Id. at 1596. It is interesting to note that immediately afterward,
Mr. Connor also asked why the committee had not included "age" in
its list of impermissible bases for discrimination and Mr. Wilson replied
that the committee had not heard any complaints or arguments "on the
question of age." Id. This was, of course, before the campaign against
"ageism" had taken hold, which actively seeks to end mandatory retirement.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 1598. Cf. Vollmer v. McGowan, 409 Ill. 306, 315, 99 N.E.2d
337, 341 (1951), in which the Illinois Supreme Court said that "property"
was a term "sufficiently comprehensive to include every interest one may
have in any and every thing which is the subject of ownership." See
notes 125-34 and accompanying text infra,
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freedom from discrimination.148 Mr. Wilson expanded upon that
statement:
Now, let me give you an idea of some of these possible exemptions which we feel are reasonable and which the legislature
would be empowered to enact. For example, the right of religious organizations to employ or provide housing for members of
their own faith only. This could be such things as children's
homes, old people's homes, and various things of that kind. The
right of truly private clubs to provide housing for their own
members only would be another example, in the committee's
view, of a reasonable exemption. And then we run into that
category which has come in popular jargon to be known as the
exemption relating to Mrs. Murphy's boarding house-that type
of exemption, or-and I think under the Federal Housing Act
this runs up to as much as a building with four apartments or
four flats in it in which one of the apartments is actually owned
-actually occupied by the owner as his own residence. Another
example of a reasonable exemption would be that relating to
small employers-employers, that is, of small numbers of employees. Just what this number would be, I don't know, of
course; but in all these areas it was the committee's feeling that
the relationship between landlord and tenant or between employer and employee was of such an intimate and personal nature
that the greater value there lies in leaving a freedom of choice
to the landlord or to the employer, as the case might be. Hence,
we have provided that the legislature may enact these exemptions. It's not required to
do so, but it has the-has the power
49
under the clause to do so.

Delegate Lawlor, a priest long associated with the so-called
"block clubs" in Chicago's racially changing southwest side, asked
if the legislature could exempt "a fifty-seven apartment building
in which the owner knows from experience that by renting to
one person or three persons of a particular minority group that all
the other occupants of that building will move out?" Mr. Wilson
quickly countered: "In my opinion Father, the exemption of an
apartment building having as many as fifty-seven apartmentsno matter what the circumstances are that you hypothesize here
-would never be a reasonable exemption under the provisions
of this clause." 50
There were other questions with respect to the meaning of
the term "self-executing." Mr. Wilson put the phrase in its
proper context when he said that "practically all provisions of
a constitution are self-executing," 51 but some delegates had
doubts. Delegate Connor asked:
I'm interested in the expression, "These rights shall be enforce48. 6

PROCEEDINGS,

supra note 20, at 69.

49. 3 id. at 1593 (emphasis added).

50. Id. at 1598.
51. Id. at 1602.
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able without action by the General Assembly." No other provision of the bill of rights contains those words. Is that becauseI have heard that this is because this was an attempt to override
the nonaction of the Illinois legislature, is that true?
MR. WILSON: Well, I don't know anything about that. We
didn't talk about the Illinois legislature in our committee; but
these words are in there for the express purpose of avoiding any
contention that (1) this is a hortatory kind of statement or (2)
that it is a right which does not come into play or into being or
does not become
effective until action is taken by the General
52
Assembly.
This led Delegate Johnson to delve more deeply:
MR. JOHNSON: Delegate Wilson, I'd like to ask you two or
three questions about this self-enacting provision. Exactly how
would that work? Supposing-supposing I had a grievance
against someone and no remedy was found in statute law; how
would I file a charge and what would happen after that?
MR. WILSON: Well, if we are right-and I think we are
right about this, Mr. Johnson-that this provision does create a
right and the legislature has not set up any procedure, the courts
are not powerless to find a remedy and to establish a remedy.
This is what courts are doing all the time. You know there is no
statutory definition, for example, of due process of law. The
courts are-decide what is due process of law, and they decide
this; and this has been the genius, of course, of the English common law. They decide this on a case-by-case basis whether or
not there has been discrimination within the purview of this...
constitutional provision. 53
The delegates did not discuss extensively the relationship between this provision and others in the proposed Bill of Rights.
In a colloquy between Convention Vice-President Elbert Smith
and Delegate Wilson it was made clear that our intent was not
to limit the rights of any person under the due process and equal
protection clauses of the constitution."4 However, the convention
never asked whether the newly proposed right to privacy provision5" could limit the broad scope of the ban on discrimination.
Nor did anyone ask if the rephrased constitutional guarantee that
everyone could "find a certain remedy in the laws for all injuries
and wrongs which he receives to his person, privacy, property or
reputation"5 0 made the self-enforcement language in the antidiscrimination provision superfluous. While perhaps redundant,
the value of the self-enforcement language lay in the express
grant of the right to take action against discrimination. 7
52. Id. at 1596.
53. Id. at 1597.
54. Id. at 1598 (discussing ILL. CONST. art I, § 2).
55. ILL. CONST. art. I, § 6. See notes 151-58 and accompanying text

infra.

56. ILL. CONST. art. I, § 12.

57. The committee comments state that this self-executing provision
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By the time the question period had ended and the time for
approval or disapproval had arrived, it was clear that our novel,
far-reaching proposal had a broad base of support. It went as
far, but no further, than the majority of the convention-and the
public-were willing to go. Efforts to weaken the provision by
the familiar legislative device of making it too broad or too narrow were defeated handily. 58
After the approval of the general nondiscrimination section,
it became apparent that there was increasing demand for other
nondiscrimination sections, which became the subjects of proposals, discussions and successful votes on second and third readings. Linda Mayer of the Welfare Council of Metropolitan Chicago, not a delegate, but a regular and invaluable attendant at
the meetings of the Bill of Rights Committee, urged that we
adopt provisions giving greater rights to the physically and mentally handicapped. Through her efforts and the cooperation of
many delegates from all points on the political and philosophical
spectrum, particularly Delegate Richard M. Daley, we eventually
succeeded in extending to the handicapped protection from discrimination "in the sale or rental or property" and from discrimination "unrelated to ability in the hiring and promotion practices
of any employer. ' 59 Unfortunately, an examination of this provision, which has not yet been utilized by any complainants and
is apparently regularly overlooked, is beyond the scope of this
article.
Late in the convention, Delegates Oda Nicholson and Betty
Howard became active in circulating a petition to incorporate in
the Bill of Rights a general provision attacking sex discrimination
in the public sector, a provision much like the Equal Rights
Amendment (ERA) proposed nationally, 61 ultimately tailored to
conform with our stylistic requirements. The two women acwas included to avoid the effects of Dorsey v. Stuyvesant Town Corp.,

299 N.Y. 512, 87 N.E.2d 541 (1949), where the court held that a general
civil rights provision in New York's constitution did not outlaw racial
discrimination in housing in the absence of legislative action. See Constitutional Commentary, ILL. ANN.CONST. art. 1, § 17 (Smith-Hurd).
58. See 3 PROCEEDINGS, supra note 20, at 1603-10.
59. ILL. CONsT. art. I, § 19.
60. For a fuller discussion of its development see GERTZ, supra note
22, at 62-63.
61. The proposed twenty-seventh amendment of the U.S. Constitution, which reads:
SECTION 1: Equality of rights under the law shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on account of
sex.
SECTION 2. The Congress shall have the power to enforce, by
appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article.
SECTION 3. This amendment shall take effect two years after
the date of ratification.
U.S. CONST. amend. XXVII (proposed).
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quired enough signatures to assure passage of the provision on
the third reading, where a more substantial vote was required.
Some delegates felt that the matter was sufficiently covered by
the equal protection provision or that it was relatively meaningless, but these arguments were brushed aside and the provision
62
was added to the Bill of Rights.
In the beginning we sought to incorporate one strong antidiscrimination provision in the Illinois Bill of Rights and, in retrospect, it seems almost a miracle that we succeeded. In the end
we incorporated not one, but three provisions banning discrimination in the Bill of Rights, which seems almost more than a
miracle. Yet the task remains incomplete. We have these rights
on paper, but we may not yet have them in practice.
SECTION 17 AND FEDERAL REMEDIES: Co-EXTENSIVE?
CONTRADICTORY? DoEs SECTION 17 Go FURTHER?

Discriminationin Employment
Before one goes directly into court via section 17, the effect
of federal law must be considered. The federal legislation
against discrimination in employment may be found in Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.68 Employers covered by the
Act are defined as persons engaged in an industry affecting commerce,6 4 which the Act defines as one in commerce, or in which
a labor dispute would hinder or obstruct commerce or the free
flow of commerce.6 5 Legislative history indicates that Congress
thought that the strongest power base by which it could control
discrimination was through its power to regulate commerce, 66
which the Supreme Court acknowledged in Heart of Atlanta
Motel, Inc. v. United States,"7 where the Court held that the scope
62. ILL. CONST. art. 1, § 18. Strange to say, it has not led to the adoption of the ERA by Illinois. Indeed, ERA has several times been defeated in Illinois, and one cannot be sure of its ultimate fate. On the
few occasions when the Illinois Supreme Court has considered cases
brought under article I, § 18, the court has held it to be a specialized
version of the equal protection clauses of the fourteenth amendment to
the U.S. Constitution and of article I, § 2 of the Illinois Constitution of
1970, in that it makes sex a "suspect classification," which must be subjected to close scrutiny and may be justified only by a compelling state
interest. See, e.g., Cessna v. Montgomery, 63 Ill. 2d 71, 344 N.E.2d 447
(1976); People v. Grammer 62 Ill. 2d 393, 342 N.E.2d 371 (1976);
People v. Ellis, 57 Ill. 2d l27, 311 N.E.2d 98 (1974).
See also People
v. Williams, 32 Ill. App. 3d 547, 336 N.E.2d 26 (1975); People v. Yocum,
31Ill. App. 3d 586, 335 N E.2d 183 (1975); People v. York, 29 Ill. App.
3d 113, 329 N.E.2d 845 (1975).
63. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1970).
64. Id. § 2000e(b).
65. Id. § 2000e(h).
66. See generally Hearings Before the Senate Committee on Com-

merce on S. 1732, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. (1963).

67. 379 U.S. 241 (1964).
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of the commerce power was broad enough to allow Congress to
prohibit discrimination. As a consequence, the federal provisions
can go no further than the commerce clause will allow. Although
the Supreme Court has interpreted the commerce clause liberally, 6s it is theoretically possible for a private employer to be
beyond its reach. In contrast, article I, section 17 was intended
to root out discrimination even in the private sector,6 9 subject
only to the legislature's enactment of reasonable exemptions.
Since these exemptions would be reasonable only if they excluded "relationships that are on so small a scale and under
circumstances so intimate that they are of a highly personal
nature, ' 70 section 17 clearly goes further than the federal employment legislation.
The Sale and Rental of Property
Federal Housing Legislation
Section 17 also covers the sale and rental of property. 71 For
most people, "property" means "housing." Federal housing legislation (Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act of 1968) ,72 until 1974, did
not prohibit sex discrimination. Moreover, probably because it is
limited by the commerce clause, it does not prohibit, discrimination in the sale or rental of single family dwellings without the
aid of any sales or rental agency, provided that the owner does
not own more than three single family dwellings. Initially,
one might argue that the sale of a single family dwelling is
within the "intimate relationship" guideline to reasonable exemptions under section 17. However, since the buyer of a single
family dwelling does not live with or have a highly personal relationship with the seller, the sale of a single family home should
not be the subject of an exemption. Therefore, in every respect
73
section 17 exceeds the scope of federal housing legislation.
68. See, e.g., Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964)

(restaurant

using certain food supplies which had traveled through interstate com-

merce held to be a business affecting commerce).

69. See note 29 and accompanying text supra.

70. See notes 49-50 and accompanying text supra. For a more detailed

discussion of reasonable exemptions, see notes 135-43 and accompanying
text infra.

71. For a more thorough examination of the term "property" see
notes 125-34 and accompanying text infra.
72. 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3607 (1970).
73. With regard to the invasion of privacy issue which section 17 enforcement might create, see notes 151-57 and accompanying text infra.
Note also that 42 U.S.C. § 3603b-2 (1970)

exempts from its coverage

apartment dwellings of less than four units where the owner actually
maintains one of the units as his place of residence. However, it may be
argued that such an exclusion is not of such a "highly personal nature"
that it could be the subject of a reasonable exemption under § 17.
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Illinois Housing Legislation
At this juncture it is appropriate to discuss Illinois statutes in
the housing area. Illinois fair housing legislation is almost a
complete nullity. Although Illinois has failed to enact a statewide open housing provision, there is an Illinois statute which
allows municipalities to prohibit discriminatory practices by real
estate brokers. 4 However, this provision applies only to the
regulation of real estate brokers and not to private owners who
engage in unfair housing practices. 75 Nevertheless, another
Illinois statute allows municipalities to "create effective regulation of housing accommodations in order to prohibit discrimination on the basis of race, creed, color, ancestry or national origin." 6 This statute fails to prohibit sex discrimination; however, the chief weakness of this statute lies in its optional nature.
If a municipal council did not enact a fair housing ordinance,
then an aggrieved person in that municipality would have no
avenue of relief. This is, at best, piecemeal progress. However,
section 17 in essence moots all these problems by providing a
statewide remedy against housing discrimination.
Other Types of Property
Although whether section 17 covers the sale and rental of
personal property is currently being litigated, 77 it is clear that
personal property is included. 78 There are no Illinois statutes directly on point. Sections 1981 and 1982 of the federal civil rights
acts together prohibit discrimination in the areas of property and
contract, and are not inhibited by the affecting commerce limitations.7 9 In Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co.,80 the Supreme Court
74. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 24, § 11-42-1 (1975).
75. Two Hundred Nine Lake Shore Bldg. Corp. v. City of Chicago,
3 Ill. App. 3d 46, 51, 278 N.E.2d 216, 220 (1971). "Thus, it is apparent
that the city's power to prohibit real estate brokers from committing unfair housing practices did not permit it to extend that regulation to private owners .... " Id. at 50, 278 N.E.2d at 219.
76. Id. at 49, 278 N.E.2d at 218 (dictum) (construing ILL. REV. STAT.
ch. 24, § 11-11.1-1 (1969)).
77. See notes 125-34 and accompanying text infra.
78. Id.
79. 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1970) provides:
All persons within the jurisdiction of the United 'States shall have
the same right in every State and Territory to make and enforce
contracts, to sue, be parties, given evidence, and to the full and equal
benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of persons and
property as is enjoyed by white citizens, and shall be subject to like
punishment, pains, penalties, taxes, licenses, and exactions of every
kind, and to no other.
42 U.S.C. § 1982 (1970) provides: "All citizens of the United States shall
have the same right, in every State and Territory, as is enjoyed by white
citizens thereof to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold, and convey real and
personal property."
80. 392U.S. 409 (1968).
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construed these sections to cover private acts of discrimination,
by reason of the thirteenth amendment and legislation passed
pursuant to it. At least in their own limited sphere, these sections can go as far as section 17. However, because they are
based on the thirteenth amendment, they generally are held to
prohibit only racial discrimination, whereas section 17 prohibits
not only racial discrimination but also discrimination based on
sex, creed, and national origin.
Another area of potential overlap lies in the federal and state
statutes dealing with public accommodations. 8 ' Again, accommodations which do not affect commerce are not subject to the federal statutes.8 2 Since in many public accommodations, such as
restaurants or clothing stores, the primary activity is transactions
in goods, section 17 might very well overlap both state and federal legislation in this area.
Overlapping State and FederalRemedies: Which to PursueFirst?
Should a person having both a federal and a state remedy
proceed under federal law first? Both 42 U.S.C. § 2000e and the
Supreme Court have given an answer. The enforcement provisions of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e describe the procedure by which a complaint is filed with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC).83 If a state or local agency has enactments similar
to the federal statutes, the EEOC will defer action until the complainant has exhausted his state remedies. 84 In addition, the
Supreme Court stated in Alexander v. Gardiner-Denver Co.85
that "Title VII was designed to supplement rather than supplant,
existing laws and institutions relating to employment discrimination." 86 Thus, in Abshire v. Chicago and Eastern Railroad Co., 87
the court held that the victim of alleged employment discrimination was required to proceed under the Illinois Fair Employment
Practices Act 8 before a charge could be filed with the EEOC. 89
The same logic would appear to require a complainant to proceed
under section 17 before he could pursue his federal remedies
because, as has been pointed out, section 17 goes further than
81. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000a (1970); ILL. Rgv. STAT. ch. 38, §§ 13-1, 13-2
(1975).
82. Note also that 42 U.S.C. § 2000a exempts private clubs. The question of whether private clubs are exempt from § 17 is discussed in notes
123-24, 135-57 and accompanying text infra.
83. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b) (1970).
84.

Id. § 2000e-5(c).

85. 415 U.S. 36 (1974).
86. Id. at 48-49.
87. 352 F. Supp. 601 (E.D. Ill. 1972).
88. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 48, §§ 851-867 (1975).

89. 352 F. Supp. at 603-04.
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Title VII. However, until there have been court decisions to
breathe life into section 17, it would be unfair to require a complainant to exhaust his section 17 remedies before invoking
Title VII.
SECTION

17's

EFFECT ON ILLINOIS STATUTES

Shortly after the adoption of the 1970 Illinois Constitution,
the Illinois Institute for Continuing Legal Education asked me to
summarize the significant features of article I, section 17 for a
seminar on the new constitution. Virtually everything I wrote
then, especially regarding its effect upon Illinois law, remains
true today.9 0
To summarize, there are four significant features of article
I, section 17 of the Illinois Constitution of 1970. First, it is meant
to prohibit discriminatory acts by private individuals as well as
by government. Bills of rights in the past have been directed
primarily against governmental encroachments upon individual
freedoms and have seldom sought to protect the rights and privileges of individuals as against other individuals. Second, it is
self-enforcing; that is, the rights granted under section 17 are
"enforceable without action by the General Assembly.""' One
who is wronged need not wait until the legislature enacts implementing legislation. Third, it adds a broad prohibition against sex
discrimination in hiring and promotion and the sale or rental of
property. This is in addition to the more traditional prohibition
of discrimination on the basis of race, color, creed, or national ancestry. In this respect, it is a pioneering provision. Finally, it
contains an exemption provision under which the legislature may
establish "reasonable" exemptions. The Bill of Rights Committee
did not intend that this power be used to "substantially undermine the substance of the right to freedom from discrimination"; rather, the provision was intended to exempt only discrimination in "relationships . . . on so small a scale and under
circumstances so intimate that they are of a highly personal na92
ture.,
I also suggested that there would have to be changes made
in existing statutes to achieve compliance with the spirit of the
antidiscrimination provision of the new constitution. I then explored the law at that time to assess what changes might be re90. See generally E. GERTZ, The 1970 Illinois Constitution Affects Individual Clients in How THE NEW CONsTiTUTrIoN AFFECTS THE PRACTICE OF
LAW § 3-1 (Ill. Inst. for Contin. Legal Educ. 1971).

91. ILL. CONST. art. I, § 17, cl. 2.
panying text supra.

See also notes 51-53 and accom-

92. 6 PROCEEDINGS, supra note 20, at 69.
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quired to achieve that compliance. To the extent that the prior
law deviated from the letter or the spirit of the new constitution,
the statutory provisions could be invalid. The following represents the effect of section 17 on the prior Illinois law with comments on legislative action since 1971.
Public Accomodations
An Illinois criminal provision prohibits discrimination in the
use of "public places of accommodation or amusement" on the
basis of race, religion, color, or national ancestry. 9 3 The 1970 constitution requires that sex be added as a prohibited basis for discrimination, at least with respect to areas involving the sale or
rental of property. However, the statute also designates such
facilities as elevators and restrooms as areas which may not be
the subject of discrimination. Obviously, discrimination in the
use of elevators and restrooms would not constitute discrimination in the sale or rental of property. To this extent, the prior
law might be broader than the section 17 requirements. The Bill
of Rights Committee realized this and chose to omit any reference
to discrimination in public places of accommodation or amusement, as the current law was deemed effective and complete.
Employment
Because the Illinois Fair Employment Practices Act 94 did not
include a prohibition against sex discrimination, it could well
have been inconsistent with the spirit of the 1970 constitution.
In 1971 the General Assembly remedied this defect by adding
"sex" to the list of impermissible bases for discrimination. 95
Moreover, numerous classes of employees exempted by the
present FEPA do not appear to be within the exemption limits
of section 17. The FEPA excludes from the definition of "employee" domestic servants in private homes and those not employed by an "employer,"9 6 which is defined as one employing
more than 25 persons.9 7 The statute provides additional exemptions for associations and not-for-profit corporations organized by
religious or fraternal groups.98
If the new antidiscrimination provision is to be effective in
prohibiting acts of private discrimination, with reasonable exemptions, the present statutory exemptions must be revised. For
93. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 38, § 13 (1975).

94.
95.
96.
97.
98.

Id. ch. 48, §§ 851-867 (1975).
Id. § 853(b) (1975).
Id. § 852(c).
Id. § 853(d).
Id.
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instance, anyone employing less than 25 persons clearly should
be considered, at least in many circumstances, an "employer"
within the 1970 constitution's ban on private discrimination in
employment. The employment of ten, fifteen, or twenty people
certainly does not necessarily constitute the relationship "of a
highly personal nature" entitled to exemption under the new
constitution. Because it is unclear what number of employees is
so small that the legislature might reasonably exempt their employer from the antidiscrimination section, the nature of the employment, not the mere number of employees, should be the
proper basis for the reasonableness of an exemption. For example, the highly personal relationship between a domestic employee
and an employer might be entitled to exemption. Certain religious activities, such as the hiring of a clergyman, are also of a
"highly personal nature" and could be validly exempted. However, the FEPA also exempts employees of religious organizations
whose jobs have no special religious functions because religious
organizations are exempted from the definition of "employer." 99
Clearly neither these employees nor those employed by fraternal
organizations should be exempt.
Except for the addition of "sex" to the list of prohibited bases
of discrimination in the FEPA, the General Assembly has failed
to amend any of these statutory provisions. But because no exemptions have been enacted since the constitution became effective, anyone ought to be able to bring an action under section 17
without fear that an exemption might preclude judgment.
The FEPA: Legislative Limit on Section 17 Remedy?
As clause two of section 17 expressly states, the legislature
may provide additional remedies for violations of section 17,
clause one. Thus, even though the legislature may create reasonable exemptions to section 17, it most assuredly cannot curb or
set up procedural impediments to a section 17 complainant's
right to immediate access to the courts. By expressly stating
only that the legislature could provide additional remedies, clause
two necessarily prohibits legislative limitation of section 17 remedies. 100
A good example of a potentially unconstitutional legislative
99. Id. See also notes 115-16 and accompanying text infra.
100. The power of the legislature to create reasonable exemptions
should not be construed to allow the legislature to limit remedies. As is
apparent from the debates, the power to establish reasonable exemptions deals with taking certain limited transactions or employment situations out of the scope of section 17. Nowhere in the debates was the
reasonable exemption power construed to allow the legislature to limit
remedies under section 17. See notes 48-50 and accompanying text supra.
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limit on a section 17 complainant's right to a remedy in court is
the FEPA. 1' 1 As stated earlier, Illinois was the last large northern industrial state to enact a fair employment practices law, and
from the start, delays and frustrations were built into the administration of the law. 10 2 Section 17 was drafted partly in response to the ineffectiveness of the old FEPA, 0 3 which was revised in 1971.104 Like section 17, the 1971 FEPA includes the new
category of sex discrimination in employment or promotions.
However, even though the FEPA seems somewhat similar in
spirit to section 17, the FEPA's adoption by incorporation of the
Administrative Review Act' 0 5 would pose serious constitutional
questions if a court were to require a complainant to exhaust
his FEPA remedies before bringing a section 17 suit, despite
the language of section 17. Because the legislature can provide additional remedies but cannot restrict existing constitutional remedies, delaying a complainant's right to immediate access to the courts and requiring him to proceed under the FEPA
would be unconstitutional. 1 6 Illinois case law on the relationship between agencies and courts further illustrates why such a
requirement of exhaustion of administrative remedies would be
unconstitutional in this instance.
In Nye v. Foreman,' the Illinois Supreme Court delineated
the relationship between the courts and agencies:
It is the province and duty of the courts to determine the meaning and true construction of constitutions and statutes, but when
the legislative department, in the enactment of laws, and the executive officers, charged with the duty of enforcing or applying
constitutional provisions and statutes "have given it a particular
and definite meaning" this conclusion will, in view of the great
injury and injustice which would result from a change in such
construction and meaning, be accorded great weight by the judiciary ...

and will, in general, control, whenever the question is

10 8
in degree doubtful or open to reasonable debate.

101. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 48, §§ 851-867 (1975).
102. See note 8 and accompanying text supra.
103. As the Vice-Chairman of the Bill of Rights Committee, James
Kemp, stated: "The citizens of our state, through legislative action in
1960, approved the theory that fair employment shall be the policy of
Illinois. Nine years of service on that administrative commission compels me to report to you that this state policy needs bolstering by way
of this constitutional proposal." 3 PROCEELDINGS, supra note 20, at 1594.
104. The amendments to the FEPA became effective August 27, 1971,
and the Illinois Constitution of 1970 became effective July 1, 1971.
105. See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 48, §§ 860-861 (1975) (incorporating ILL.
REv. STAT. ch. 110, §§ 264-279 (1975)).

106. It would not be unconstitutional to provide the FEPC as an
agency in which a complainant could voluntarily submit his complaint
to be administered and decided. Such an agency can provide valuable
investigative resources that the normal complainant cannot afford.
107. 215 Ill. 285, 74 N.E. 140 (1905).
108. Id. at 289, 74 N.E. at 141. Accord, Monsanto Co. v. Pollution Con-
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When the FEPA adopted the Administrative Review Act, by
implication it also adopted the Illinois case law that defines the
relationship between agencies and the courts. The FEPA allows
the FEPC to establish guidelines, 10 9 and because of Nye v. Foreman a court would have to give "great weight" to these guidelines. This would, in effect, prevent the complainant from getting
a de novo ruling on the law. Thus, if a court required a section
17 complainant to proceed first under the FEPA and exhaust his
administrative remedies, the court's subsequent giving of great
weight to FEPC rulings would unconstitutionally impede the
complainant's right to a court ruling on the law in his case.
The FEPA may also impose questionable restrictions on the
way in which findings of fact are made in employment discrimination cases. In Fenyes v. State Retirement System, 10° the court

stated that the findings of fact made by an administrative agency
were prima facie correct and could be set aside only if they
were against the manifest weight of the evidence. "Where there
is evidence to support the findings of the administrative agency,
its decision will be affirmed.""'
In Klein v. Fair Employment Practices Commission,"' the
court restated the Fenyes proposition in applying it to a FEPA
action:
Section 8 of FEPA provides that a charge shall be dismissed if
the Commission determines after investigation that there is a
lack of substantial evidence to support it . . . this evidentiary

standard was left deliberately vague by the legislature, we believe, to permit the Commission some degree of discretion in ascertaining and evaluating the facts.... Upon review a court
cannot try the case de novo or question the wisdom of the Com-

mission's judgment. Rather the proper scope of review should
be to ascertain from an adequate record whether the Commission's order of dismissal is arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of
discretion.118

Thus, not only would a court have to give great deference to the
Commission's rulings on the law, but it would also have to bow
to the Commission's findings of fact. This would unconstitutiontrol Bd., 39 Ill. App. 3d 333, 350 N.E.2d 289 (1976); Tegg v. Fair Employment Practices Comm'n, 28 Ill. App. 3d 932, 329 N.E.2d 486 (1975).
109. ILL. REv.STAT. ch. 48, § 857.
110. 17 Ill. 2d 106, 160 N.E.2d 810 (1959).

111. Id. at 111-12, 160 N.E.2d at 812. Accord, Kellogg Switchboard &
S. Corp. v. Department of Rev., 14 Ill. 2d 434, 153 N.E.2d 45 (1958).
112. 31 Ill. App. 3d 473, 334 N.E.2d 370 (1975).
113. Id. at 481-82, 334 N.E.2d at 376 (emphasis added). It is interesting to note that the court in Klein also held that a complainant would
not be allowed to participate in the commission's investigations or initial

determination. As a result the complainant is virtually bound by the

commission's findings of fact, although he cannot even follow the investigation to make sure that this semi-binding decision is made fairly.
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ally deprive the complainant of his right to a de novo trial, and
would effectively extinguish his right to have a jury find the
facts of the case.
To require the delay that an agency involves and to require a court to give deference to an agency's guidelines on the
law and its findings of fact would be an unconstitutional limit on
the direct court remedy provided in section 17."1
The FEPA
is not unconstitutional in itself. The FEPC's investigative tools
and resources may be invaluable to complainants who cannot
afford to foot the bill themselves. The FEPA only becomes of
114. Another potential indirect threat that the FEPA poses can be
found in an appellate court decision. In City of Cairo v. Fair Employment Practices Comm'n, 21 Ill. App. 3d 358, 315 N.E.2d 344 (1974), the
court noted that the racial discrimination provisions of Illinois and the
federal government were so similar that in the absence of Illinois case
law, "the federal decisions regarding racial discrimination in employment, while not controlling are relevant and helpful precedents." The
court then went on to utilize the decision of Griggs v. Duke Power Co.,
401 U.S. 424 (1970), to determine the standard to be used to determine
whether racial discrimination existed. Griggs dealt with a job examination that was racially neutral on its face, but which had the effect of
excluding a disproportionate amount of blacks. The Court held that
even though no intent to discriminate was evidenced from the test, the
test was discriminatory in its impact since it operated to freeze the status
quo of prior discriminatory practices. The Court in Griggs decided that
the object of Title VII was to remove arbitrary and artificial barriers to
employment when they operate to discriminate invidiously, intentionally
or not. The court in Cairo applied the Griggs impact test to invalidate
a hiring practice by the City of Cairo. The Cairo adoption of the impact
test in FEPA cases is in itself a boon for discrimination complainants,
for the impact test imposes a far easier burden of proof than does the
intent test. But, with the Burger Court's recent adverse decisions oP discrimination complaints (see, e.g., General Electric Co. v. Gilbert, 429
U.S. 881 (1976); Washington v. Davis, 429 U.S. 229 (1976)), the infusion
of federal decisions might portend a bleak future for discrimination complainants in Illinois and could, if not carefully watched, greatly limit
the effectiveness of section 17. For example, in Washington v. Davis,
429 U.S. 229 (1976), the Supreme Court was confronted with a complaint
brought under the fifth amendment against an employment test given
by the District of Columbia. Title VII did not apply to the District of
Columbia at that time; any discrimination complaint, therefore, had to
be based on the U.S. Constitution. As in the Griggs case, the test complained of was racially neutral on its face. However, the Court held
that the test was not racially discriminatory, even though it had a disproportionate impact, because the statutory impact test of Griggs was held
not to apply to a constitutional issue. The Court then went on to state
that in federal constitutional discrimination cases, the intent, test was the
appropriate test.
The danger for section 17 in the combination of Cairo and Washington is obvious. A court confronted with a case brought directly under
section 17 might decide that the holding in Washington, applying the intent test in federal constitutional cases rather than the impact test used
in Title VII cases, would by analogy require application of the intent
test in Illinois constitutional cases under section 17 rather than the impact
test used in FEPA cases. This, I feel, would be a grievous error. Where-

as the fifth amendment of the U.S. Constitution does not specifically prohibit discrimination and does not mandate either the intent or impact
test, section 17 specifically mandates the eradication of discrimination in

all its forms, and in this regard is closer to Title VII. Since the Illinois
constitution has this specific section against discrimination, it would seem
appropriate to apply the stricter standard of the impact test.
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questionable constitutionality when it is forced upon an unwilling
complainant who desires to proceed directly under section 17
without the impediments imposed under the FEPA.
CumuwRT LITIGATION INVOLVING SECTION 17
Even though the 1970 constitution and section 17 have been
in effect for almost seven years, only two cases have mentioned
the section at all, and only one of these cases has analyzed some
of the important aspects of section 17 in depth.
In the first case involving section 17, there is merely a passing reference. In Fair Employment Practices Commission v.
Rush Presbyterian St. Luke's Medical Center,115 a complainant
brought suit under the FEPA alleging sex discrimination on the
part of the center. The medical center claimed that it was a religious organization and as such was exempted under the FEPA,
which excludes- religious organizations from the definition of
"employer.""16 The complainant claimed that the center was not
a religious organization despite its religious affiliations. Although the trial court held for the center, the appellate court reversed on the ground that the center's religious affiliations were
so minimal that it did not come under the religious organization
exemption. The American Civil Liberties Union filed an amicus
curiae brief attacking the constitutionality of the FEPA's religious organization exemption. One argument advanced was that
it was in conflict with article I, section 17. The appellate court
dismissed the argument because it had not been raised at trial
115. 41 Ill. App. 3d 712, 354 N.E.2d 596 (1976).
116. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 48, § 852(d) (1975), provides:
The term "employer" does not include any not for profit corporation
or association organized for fraternal or religious purposes, nor any
school, educational or charitable institution owned and conducted by,
or affiliated with, a church or religious institution, nor any exclusively social club, corporation or association that is not organized
for profit.
There was some discussion during the debates about reasonable exemptions and religious organizations. In describing what a reasonable
exemption might be, Delegate Wilson stated, "Now, let me give you an
idea of some of these possible exemptions which we felt are reasonable.
and which the legislature would be empowered to enact .... For example, the right of religious organizations to employ or provide housing
for members of their own faith only." 3 PROCEEDINGS, supra note 20, at
1593. From Delegate Wilson's example it seems clear that it would be
perfectly justifiable for a religious organization to hire a minister or rabbi
who followed its own faith. However, it might not be reasonable to allow a religious organization to discriminate in the hiring of secretarial
or janitorial staff. The test of reasonableness might be the "job relatedness test" which has been applied in the federal area. See, e.g., Griggs
v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1970) (discussed at note 114 supra).
A carte blanche religious organization exemption as contained in § 2(d)
of the FEPA would almost certainly not be a reasonable exemption because it is overbroad.
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and therefore could not be raised on appeal. Thus, the court did
not consider the issues presented under section 17.
Davis v. Attic Club
A case recently decided by the Illinois Appellate Court (1st
District) presents squarely many important issues under section
17. In Davis v. Attic Club,117 the plaintiffs sought declaratory
and other relief against certain Chicago clubs for their admittedly
discriminatory practice of barring women from purchasing and
being served alcoholic beverages in certain areas of the respective clubs. The plaintiffs based their complaint on two different
theories.
Application of the Liquor Control Act
The plaintiffs' first theory was based on a construction of
the Liquor Control Act which is helpful in understanding the
section 17 problems. The plaintiffs maintained that if the clubs
wanted to keep their liquor licenses, section 133 of the Liquor
Control Act compelled them to provide equal access in their
establishments to all persons. 118 The defendants claimed that
section 95.24 of the same Act, in which the term "club" is defined,
impliedly exempted them from the reach of section 133.119
Although section 95.24 contains no language of exemption whatsoever, the trial court agreed with the defendants. The court
stated that to hold that private clubs were not exempt from
section 133 would make section 95.24 "inoperative," for this
holding would make a definition of "club" unnecessary. It
relied upon the rule of statutory interpretation that "[w]here
different sections of a statute are in seeming conflict it is the
court's duty to construe the pertinent sections in a manner that
120
renders each section operative."'
Although section 95.24 does not contain any express state117. Davis v. Attic Club, No. 73 L. 18515 (Cook Cnty. Cir. Ct., June 18,
(1975) (Bua, J.), affd, 371 N.E.2d 903 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Davis
v. Attic Club].
118. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 43, § 133 (1975):
No licensee licensed under the provisions of this Act shall deny or
permit his agents and employees to deny any person the full and

equal enjoyment of the accommodations, advantages, facilities and

privileges of any premises, in which alcoholic liquors are authorized
to be sold subject only to the conditions and limitations established
by law, and applicable alike to all citizens.
119. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 43, § 95.24 (1975): "'Club' means a corporation organized under the laws of this State, not for pecuniary profit,
solely for the promotion of some common object other than the sale or
consumption of alcoholic liquors, kept, used and maintained by its members through the payment of annual dues. .. "
120. Davis v. Attic Club, supra note 117, memo. op. at 5.
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ment of intent to exempt clubs from section 133, the court decided that section 95.24 was a "condition and limitation established by law" as permitted under section 133. However, the
court's contention that holding otherwise would make section
95.24 "inoperative" is rather tenuous, even assuming that there
could be a conflict between a purely definitional section such as
section 95.24 and a general prohibitory section like section 133.
From the memorandum opinion and the defendant's appellate
court briefs one receives the impression that bringing clubs under section 133 would turn private clubs into public houses, like
taverns. 1 21 This would mean that the only distinguishing factor
between a private club and a tavern would be the private club's
ability to discriminate. Although some cynics and realists on
both sides might agree that this is indeed the primary purpose of
these clubs, the definition of "club" contained in section 95.24 in
no way intimates, either expressly or implicitly, that, in order for
an establishment to constitute a club, it must discriminate in
some manner.
The pertinent language of section 95.24 defines a "club" as a
not-for-profit corporation organized solely for the promotion of
some common object other than the sale of alcoholic liquors, kept,
used and maintained by its members through payment of annual
dues. A club could theoretically exist for the sole purpose of discriminating against a certain group, but surely a club could be
organized for some purpose other than discrimination. In short,
even if section 133 prohibits clubs from discriminating, private
clubs will not become public restaurants. They would still have
to be not-for-profit and organized for some sole purpose, their
members would still have to pay annual dues, and the "public"
could be excluded. A club could set extremely high dues, retain
its private nature and at the same time not violate section 133.
Moreover, private clubs would not be eliminated by construing
section 133 as applicable to them, since they conceivably could
still discriminate so long as they did not serve alcohol. Thus,
section 133 would not make section 95.24 inoperative if it were
applied to clubs. Consequently the trial courts' opinion is on
shaky ground, for clubs as defined under section 95.24 could still
exist; they simply could not discriminate in membership and
access.

However, the biggest weakness in the trial court's reasoning
is its assumption that the sole purpose for defining "club" was
somehow to impliedly exempt clubs from section 133. But there
121. See generally Brief for Appellee Chicago Club et al., Davis v. Attic Club, supra note 117.
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appear to be two other, far more obvious purposes for the definition. First, establishments which fall under the definition
of "club" in section 95.24 are expressly granted certain privileges
elsewhere in the Act. For example, clubs may sell liquor within
12 2
100 feet of schools and churches, while taverns may not.
Second, the word "club" is only one of twenty-eight words and
phrases defined, all without any language of exemption, in section 95, the general definitional section of the Liquor Control
Act. Other words defined include "hotel," "restaurant," "bowling alley," "distributor," even "retailer"; in short, every establishment which could possibly be a liquor licensee and to which,
therefore, section 133 could possibly apply, is defined in section
95. Consistent application of the trial court's method of statutory construction would require that each of these definitions
be treated as an exemption, too. Such a construction would,
ironically, render section 133 inoperative, an obviously absurd
result. Primarily because of the trial court's shaky reasoning
in this area, the supreme court might ultimately be able to avoid
deciding the section 17 issues.
Application of Section 17
The trial court next faced the issue of whether section 17
applied to prohibit the clubs from discriminating in the sale of
liquor. However, the trial court framed the issue as being
"[w] hether the exemption for clubs (Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 43 §95.24)
is violative of Article I, section 17.' '123 It should be pointed out
that although the court characterized section 95.24 as an exemption for private clubs, nowhere in section 95.24 is there any
reference to its being a reasonable exemption from section 17.124
"Property"-Real,Personal,or Both?
One of the first issues that the court examined was the meaning of the term "property" in section 17. The defendants maintained that it was the intent of the framers and of the electorate
who adopted the constitution that the term "property" in section
17 include only real property.1 25 Thus, the clubs' sale of alcohol
122. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 43, § 127 (1975).
123. Davis v. Attic Club, supra note 117, memo op. at 6 (emphasis
added).
124. For that matter, it most obviously would not have been termed
an exemption by its drafters since section 95.24 was enacted in 1949, well
before section 17 was a twinkle in its framers' eyes. For a more detailed
discussion of this aspect of the case see notes 141-70 and accompanying
text infra.
125. See Brief for Appellee Union League Club at 28-34, Davis v. Attic
Club, supra note 117.
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would not be covered by section 17's provisions against discrimination in the sale of property.
The defendants contended that the transcripts from the debates were inconclusive as to whether personal property was to
be covered.120 They contended that since the debates were inconclusive, the proper way to determine what the term "property"
meant was to determine the meaning of the term in the minds of
the voters when they ratified the constitution. They alleged that
this meaning could be derived from the official explanation of
the proposed constitution, which described the new protections
in these terms: "all persons are guaranteed freedom from dis,127
crimination in housing and employment ....
The trial court accepted the defendants' major premise that
in "construing constitutional provisions, the true inquiry is, what
was the understanding of the meaning of the words used by the
voters who adopted it."'12 8 Moreover, the court added, in constru-

ing provisions of a constitution "the words employed therein
shall be given the meaning which they bear in ordinary use
among the people. The natural and ordinary meaning of the
words is to be accepted, except where a word is used the meaning
whereof is established by ...

judicial construction." 29 Since the

term "property" does in fact have a well-established judicial construction and that construction is not doubtful, 30 the court held
that "property" in article I, section 17 included all property, both
real and personal.' 3 '
The court's holding on this point is supported by the fact that
the term "property" is used in another context in the constitution. Article I, section 2 of the Illinois Constitution of 1970 is basically a reenactment of the 1870 Illinois Constitution's due proc126. They cited various portions of the debates:
Mr. JASKULA: ... Did you mean to include personal property

also?
MR. WILSON: The word Mr. Jaskula, is "property" and I assume that it would include personal property. However, I think the
real rub comes in real estate which is not movable, of course. Iwe didn't-I must say that I recall that we heard no testimony about
discrimination in the sale of portable property-property that people
can take and move around.
3 PROCEEDINGS, supra note 20, at 1578. The appellees contended that the
above remarks were ambiguous in that Delegate Wilson did not expressly
say that the committee intended to include personal property. Brief for
Appellee Union League Club at 29, Davis v. Attic Club, supra note 117.
But see text accompanying notes 35 and 47 supra.

127. 3 PROCEEDINGS, supra note 20, at 2673.

128.
129.
(1904)
130.
N.E.2d
131.

Davis v. Attic Club, supra note 117, memo op. at 4.
Id. (citing Burke v. Snively, 208 Ill. 328, 340, 70 N.E. 327, 329
(emphasis added).
E.g., People ex rel. Keenan v. McGuane, 13 Ill. 2d 520, 527, 150
168, 172 (1958).
Davis v. Attic Club, supra note 117, memo op. at 4.
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ess clause. 8 2 This clause uses the term "property," and most assuredly "property" in this context means both real and personal
property. Consequently, when section 17 uses the term "property" without any qualification, it must also mean both real and
personal property. As the court noted:
Should the court construe "property" in a restrictive sense to
mean only real property, it would be difficult to apply the same
to property as used in Article I, section 2 which states: "No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property. . .

."

With this

word being used in two sections of Article I, only a comprehensive definition would allow these two constitutional sections to
coexist and retain their strength. The Court will not dilute the

meaning of property in Article I, section 2.133
Once the court determined that section 17 covered personal
property, it was obvious that section 17 covered the private clubs'

sale of alcoholic beverages, which are clearly personal property.
The court was thus confronted with the central question of the
case: whether private clubs were somehow exempt from the
coverage of section 17.134
Private Clubs and Section 95.24: A Reasonable Exemption?

The Court's Holding
The trial court found that section 95.24 and its supposed

grant of an exemption from section 133 constituted a "reasonable
exemption" from article I, section 17, as allowed by section 17,
clause 2.135 The court reasoned that although section 95.24 was
enacted before the 1970 constitution was ratified, the transition
schedule of the 1970 constitution preserved the section as a rea-

sonable exemption.' 38 The court, therefore, treated the question

of the reasonableness of a private club exemption on two levels.
132. ILL. CONST. art. I, § 2: "No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law nor be denied the equal protection of the laws."
133. Davis v. Attic Club, supra note 117, memo op. at 4.
134. The actual issue before the court was whether private clubs were
exempt from the provisions of section 17 in their sale of alcohol. However, as has been mentioned, the court seems to have read a general reasonable exemption for private clubs into section 95.24 of the Liquor Control Act, which by the court's previous ruling exempted private clubs
only from the section 133 prohibitions against discrimination in the sale
of liquor. The court's construction of a general exemption for private
clubs from a section which, if it provides an exemption at all, provides
one only for a specific transaction (the sale of liquor), is dubious, notwithstanding any questions of anticipatory legislation. See notes 14450 and accompanying text infra.
135. It should be reiterated that, perplexing as it may seem, the court
was treating section 95.24 of the Liquor Control Act as a general exemption for private clubs, even though it is purely a definitional section and
contains no language of exemption whatsoever.
136. See ILL. CONST. trans. sched., § 9, which provides: "All laws, ordinances, regulations and rules of court not contrary to, or inconsistent
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On one level, according to the court, the framers of section 17
intended a private club exemption to be a reasonable exemption.
On the second level, according to the court, it would be reasonable to construe section 17 so that it potentially could exempt
private clubs. So construed, it would not be in conflict with the
rights of privacy guaranteed in article I, sections 5 and 6. The
trial court's holding is vulnerable on both levels.
The Framers' Intent
In holding that the framers of section 17 intended that private clubs be exempted, the court quoted from Delegate Wilson's
statement in the debates that ". . . the job of a bill of rights always is a job of balancing and trying to evaluate competing interests . . . the right of truly private clubs to provide housing for
their own members only would be ... a reasonable exemption. ' '18 7 From this the court concluded that "[i] f an exemption
for private clubs in the area of housing would be recognized as
reasonable, the mere recognition of 'clubs' would also be reasonable."' 18 This conclusion is confusing and appears to be incorrect.
First, the court's view that the right of all persons to gain
access to private clubs without discrimination would be the death
knell to private clubs is simply not valid.'8 9 Clubs could still exist as long as they did not discriminate. Therefore, allowing
them to discriminate would not confer "mere recognition" upon
clubs, 140 as the court said, but would give them the ability to select their members solely from certain races, religious groups, nationalities, and one sex.
Delegate Wilson's hypothetical reasonable exemption related
only to housing in private clubs. To expand this example to allow the type of discrimination in membership, access, and the sale
of property complained of in Davis is therefore tenuous. There
is, however, an even stronger reason for not allowing section
95.24 to be viewed as a reasonable 'exemption to section 17.
with, the provisions of the Constitution shall remain in force ...
phasis added).

."

(em-

137. Davis v. Attic Club, supra note 117, memo op. at 7.
138. Id. at 8.
139. See notes 121-22 and accompanying text supra.
140. Moreover, section 95.24 is not the "mere recognition" of clubs, but
instead is a definition of "clubs" for the Liquor Control Act. It seems
that the court lost sight of what it was deciding. However, one could
argue that the court unwittingly declared that an exemption for private
clubs, in general, would be reasonable. However reasonable this might
be, section 17, clause 2 makes it very clear that only the legislature, not
the courts, may establish reasonable exemptions.
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The Transition Schedule
Granting the premise that a private club exemption would
be reasonable, has the legislature enacted such an exemption as
per section 17, clause 2? The Union League Club's appellate brief
tried to establish that the framers of section 17 recognized that
a private club exemption would be reasonable. 4 1 From these
passages in the debates, the defendants concluded that since the
framers knew that private club exemptions were already in existence (presumably section 95.24), they necessarily intended that
those already in existence at the time of the convention would
continue to be valid.
However, this conclusion fails to take into account the express language of section 17, clause 2, which states that the legislature may enact reasonable exemptions, but they can do this
only in the future . . . after the section is adopted. To say that
the framers recognized the possibility that private clubs could be
-exempted does not mean that there necessarily had to be such
an exemption nor that one already existed. Section 95.24 was
passed in 1949, well before the 1970 Constitutional Convention.
How could the 1949 legislature have used article I, section 17,
clause 2 to enact a reasonable exemption to article I, section 17,
clause 1, before article I, section 17 was even proposed?
The trial court countered this argument by invoking the
transition schedule of the 1970 constitution. 1 42 The court reasoned that since section 95.24 was not in conflict with section 17,
clause 1, it was validated or ratified by the transition schedule
despite its priority in time. This conclusion is specious because
it fails to take into account clause 2 of section 17. Even though
section 95.24 might not conflict with the "reasonableness" requirement of clause 1, it does conflict with the "futurity" requirement of clause 2, since section 95.24 is not an exemption that was
passed after the 1970 constitution was adopted. Thus, section
95.24 cannot be validated via the transition schedule since it is a
prior law which is inconsistent with a provision of the constitution.
Moreover, it is important that the reasonable exemption requirement of section 17 work prospectively, because it requires
the legislature to reevaluate statutes previously enacted in light
of the spirit of the new section. This is bolstered by section 2 of
the transition schedule, which states that "[a] ny rights, procedural or substantive created for the first time by Art. I shall be
141. Brief for Appellee Union League Club at 26-27, Davis v. Attic

Club, supra note 117.

142. See note 136 supra.
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prospective and not retroactive.' 143 Section 17 was undoubtedly a
newly created right and as such its allowance for reasonable exemptions should have only a prospective effect.
Anticipatory Legislation
One possible argument is that section 95.24 should be considered anticipatory legislation and that the clubs' exemption is a
valid exemption under clause 2. The concept of anticipatory legislation to the 1970 Illinois Constitution derives from People ex
rel. Ogilvie v. Lewis. 44 In that case the Illinois Supreme Court
held that "the enactment of legislation in anticipation of an
adopted but not yet effective constitutional provision is within
the plenary lawmaking power of the legislature."' 45 The court
placed particular emphasis on the fact that the legislation in Ogilvie expressly stated that it was enacted in anticipation of the 1970
constitution,1 4 6 and the court also noted that the statute's effective date was delayed until after the effective date of the 1970
constitution. 14 7 Applying the principles enunciated in Ogilvie,
the Illinois Supreme Court in Kanellos v. Cook County14 held
invalid a statute enacted prior to the 1970 constitution which
placed a limit on the home rule powers of municipalities:
We therefore hold that this statute is inapplicable as applied to
a home rule county. It was enacted prior to and not in anticipation of the constitution of 1970 which introduced the concepts of
home rule. .

.

. Such considerationswere totally foreign in the

contemplation of legislation adopted prior to the 1970 constitu49
tion.

1

If we apply the principles of Ogilvie and Kanellos to section
95.24, it is apparent that section 95.24 is not anticipatory legislation. Section 95.24 was not legislation enacted in anticipation of
an adopted but not yet effective constitutional provision. Indeed,
it was enacted in 1949, twenty-one years before the 1970 constitution was even written. Thus, it is in no way comparable to the
legislation upheld in Ogilvie. 50 Section 95.24 more closely resembles the legislation invalidated in Kanellos. Like the provision for county home rule, section 17 was a newly created provi143. ILL. CONST. trans. sched., § 2.
144. 49 Ill. 2d 476, 274 N.E.2d 87 (1971).
145. Id. at 483, 274 N.E.2d at 92.
146. Id. at 482, 274 N.E.2d at 92.
147. Id. at 482, 274 N.E.2d at 92.
148. 53 Ill. 2d 161, 290 N.E.2d 240 (1972).
149. Id. at 166-67, 290 N.E.2d at 243 (emphasis added).
150. Moreover, it is obvious that section 95.24 does not contain any
anticipatory preamble nor does it delay its effective date like the legislation in Ogilvie.
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sion. Its considerations must have been as totally foreign as
county home rule was twenty-one years before the 1970 constitution was adopted. To say that section 95.24 is anticipatory legislation is to play havoc with the plain meaning of the word "anticipatory," for one cannot anticipate something unless one knows
that it will indeed occur. Obviously the legislature in 1949 could
never have anticipated section 17, because it could not have foreseen the drafting of the 1970 constitution.
Section 17 and Privacy
The clubs contended, and the trial court held, that to construe section 17 as prohibiting discrimination by private clubs
would bring it into conflict with the right of privacy guaranteed
in article I, sections 5 and 6 of the 1970 Illinois Constitution.' 5'
The gist of the argument was that if the government mandated
that the clubs grant equal access to all, it would infringe upon
their right of privacy.
The first problem with this argument is that the plaintiffs
in the instant case were not asking to be admitted as members,
but were instead requesting that if clubs sell property, such as
alcoholic beverages, then they must provide equal access for all
to purchase this property. If the clubs do not want to associate
with women, then all they have to do is to stop selling liquor or
other property, which would probably render the section inoperative.
However, even on the broader question of whether section
17 may mandate equal membership opportunities, the privacy argument still will not pass muster. The line of federal cases starting with Griswold v. Connecticut show that there is only a constitutional right of privacy to be free from unwarranted government intrusion. 1 52 Cases brought under the Illinois constitution
also view this right as one against governmental invasions. 15 3
151. ILL. CoNsT. art. I, § 5: "The people have the right to assemble
in a peaceable manner, to consult for the common good. . . ." Id. § 6:
"the people shall have the right to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers and other possessions against unreasonable searches, seizures, invasions of privacy or interceptions of communications by eavesdropping
devices or other means ...
"
152. E.g., Carey v. Population Serv. Int'l., 97 S. Ct. 2010 (1977); Roe
v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479
(1965).

It is also interesting to note that in these cases the Court applied

a balancing test, weighing the state's interest against the individual's
right of privacy. If the state could show a compelling interest it could
outweigh the individual's right of privacy. Thus if section 17 were ever
attacked on the grounds that it violated federal constitutional rights of
privacy, it could be defended on the grounds that Illinois has a compelling state interest in promoting harmony among its citizens by pro-

hibiting discrimination.
153. See generally Illinois State Employ. Ass'n. v. Walker, '57 Ill. 2d
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The committee report for article I, section 6 states that "every
person [should] be guaranteed a zone of privacy in which his
thoughts and highly personal behavior were not subject to disclosure or review. The new provision creates a direct right to
freedom from such invasions of privacy by government or public
1 4
officials." '
Applying these principles to the Davis case, it is apparent
that the defendants' complaint of an invasion of privacy is not
in fact the type of governmental intrusion envisioned by the
framers of article I, section 6 nor by the Supreme Court in the
Griswold line of cases. In Davis it is not the government that
is causing the "harm," but private individuals who voluntarily enter the clubs. By prohibiting discrimination in section 17 the
government is not mandating that persons enter the clubs; instead it is breaking down a barrier so that other private individuals may enter. Clearly this is not a governmental intrusion into
"highly personal behavior and thoughts." Moreover, since the
plaintiffs only request equal access to the purchase of alcohol and
do not desire membership, the question of privacy becomes even
less important, since the defendants' thoughts and highly personal behavior are certainly not intruded upon by requiring them
to refrain from discriminating in the sale of liquor. 1 55
The trial court assumed that section 17 would conflict with
sections 5 and 6 if it were construed to prohibit discrimination
by private clubs. The court thus felt compelled to "harmonize
them if practicable.' 156 However, this contention fails because
section 17's reasonable exemptions should be designed only to
prevent infringement upon relationships of a highly personal nature. 5 7 Indeed, the scope of section 17 ends where the right of
privacy begins; thus the trial court's manufacture of a purported
clash between these rights is strained.
Nevertheless, even if one accepts the court's premise that sec512, 315 N.E.2d 9 (1974); Stein v. Howlett, 52 Ill. 2d 570, 289 N.E.2d 509,
appeal dismissed, 412 U.S. 915 (1972).
154. Constitutional Commentary, ILL. ANN. CONST., art. 1, § 6 (SmithHurd).
155. See, e.g., Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160 (1976), where the Supreme Court held that to require a private school to open its doors to
blacks did not violate that associational right of privacy which entitles
persons to associate for the advancement of beliefs and ideas, because,
as such, the requirement of black admission did not inhibit the school
from teaching the idea of racial discrimination. This reasoning is directly applicable to the Davis case, for requiring admission of women
to these clubs would not infringe on the members' rights to associate
for the purpose of exchanging ideas and beliefs.
156. Davis v. Attic Club, supra note 117, memo op. at 8 (emphasis
added) (quoting from Oak Park Fed. S. & L. v. Oak Park, 54 Ill. 2d
200, 203, 296 N.E.2d 344 (1973)).
157. See, e.g., note 32 and accompanying text supra.
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tion 17 clashes with sections 5 and 6, the court's "harmonization"
of this problem is highly questionable. "The court need not 'harmonize' these conflicts by judicial fiat. The exemption for clubs
in Ill. Rev. Stat. 43 § 95.24 is a legislative act that is reasonable
in its recognition and harmonization of the conflict between §§ 5
and 6 and § 17 in this case."' 158 The absurdity of this proposition
is apparent. How could the legislature of 1949 recognize and harmonize three sections of the 1970 constitution when two of the
three sections were not even in existence at that time? And
why would it choose to do so by means of an implied exemption
by definition?
The Appellate Court
On December 21, 1977 (while this article was already in the
publication process), the Illinois Appellate Court, First District,
delivered an affirmance of Judge Bua's decision on the trial level.
Justice Mel Jiganti wrote the majority opinion, with Justice Seymour Simon filing a strong dissent. 15 9 Although the majority
opinion is confusing at some essential points, it seems to have followed, for the most part, the trial court's lead. With regard to
the section 133 statutory question, as did the trial court opinion,
the majority opinion assumes that a private club's selectivity in
membership is synonymous with an unlimited right to discriminate. Consequently, it also reads the definition of "club" contained in section 95.24 as impliedly exempting private clubs from
section 133's general prohibition against discrimination, without
ever concretely addressing the question of why a "definitional"
section like section 95.24 should be read as an "exemption"
section.
With regard to article I, section 17, the appellate court
reaches an even more disturbing conclusion. With reasoning
both sparse and troubling, the court concludes that since the Bill
of Rights committee comments contain a reference to the fact
that a proposal on voluntary associations was rejected, the framers of section 17 must never have intended private clubs to fall
within the scope of section 17. In support of this conclusion
the court quotes from Delegate Wilson's remarks on the convention floor that a private club exemption in certain areas might be
a reasonable exemption. 60 Armed with these somewhat limited
comments made by the framers, the court carves out a broad and
unlimited exemption for private clubs. This decision poses grave
158. Davis v. Attic Club, supra note 117, memo op. at 8.
159. Davis v. Attic Club, 371 N.E.2d 903 (Ill. App. 1977).
160. See text accompanying note 49 supra.
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dangers, not only in its immediate impact, but also in its potential
as a precedent for judicial emasculation of section 17.
Section 17, clause 2 provides that the legislature may create
reasonable exemptions to the antidiscrimination provisions of the
section. But here, the court, based upon very weak evidence
from the convention proceedings, somehow concludes that private clubs are completely excluded from section 17. The trial
court at least tried to follow the format of section 17 in holding
that section 95.24 constituted a reasonable exemption enacted by
the legislature. The appellate court, on the other hand, has sua
sponte found that private clubs are totally exempted from the
coverage of section 17. This is a blatant usurpation of a function
granted only to the legislature by the express language of the
constitution. Such a procedure would give courts the power to
ride roughshod over the express language of section 17. When
presented with a case brought under section 17, all that a court
would have to do would be to peer selectively into some portion
of the debates that supported its position and thus create another broad exclusion. It cannot be emphasized too much that
the only role that the court should play under section 17, clause
2 is to determine whether a particular legislative exemption is
in fact a reasonable exemption.
The Dissent
Justice Simon, in his dissent, attacked the majority's use of
section 95.24 as an exemption to section 133 on the ground that
it was purely a definitional section and not an exemption section.
With regard to the court's section 17 argument he pointed out one
of the most glaring weaknesses in the majority's reliance on the
portion of the proceedings that they cited:
Neither the Committee report nor the remarks of Delegate Wilson indicate the specific nature of the proposal on voluntary associations which was presented to the Committee. Thus, it is
quite possible that the Committee members and delegates were
content to forego a provision relating to voluntary associations
because they regarded the proposal which actually was adopted
as sufficient to prohibit discrimination in the sale of property by
clubs such as the defendants. 16 1
In short, Justice Simon felt that the majority's position relied on
some tangential comments in the proceedings to avoid the intended purpose of section 17 and deflate "the energetic and farranging emphasis in recent years upon eliminating discrimination
in our state." 16 2
161. Davis v. Attic Club, 371 N.E.2d 903, 912 (Ill. App. 1977) (Simon,
J., dissenting).
162. Id. at 912.
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Unrealized Expectations of Section 17
DAVIS AND THE FUTURE OF SECTION

17

Although the trial and appellate courts in Davis seem to
have ruled properly on only one aspect of section 17 (the meaning
of the term "property"), and although both seem to have misread
article I, section 17, clause 2, ultimately these conclusions will almost surely be reconsidered in the Illinois Supreme Court. With
supreme court decisions heralding the way, I hope that section
17 will be put to the use to which it was originally intended.
Would-be litigants are not content with a general warrant to
sue, as is evidenced not only by the antidiscrimination sections
of the Illinois Constitution of 1970, but also by section 12, the
right to a remedy provision. 68 They want to have the rights,
remedies and procedures spelled out in detail. They are not content with a general warrant even if it is labeled self-executing.
Litigants and their lawyers are creatures of habit. They look to
form books, precedents, what has already been decided in their
situation. Should there suddenly be litigation in this area, particularly a helpful decision by the Illinois Supreme Court in the
Davis case, it will encourage even more litigation. There will be
an accelerated process. Meanwhile, with regard to employment
practices, aggrieved persons will be content to appear before the
Illinois Fair Employment Practices Commission. Why go to the
expense, delay and uncertainty of preparing forms, obtaining discovery and going to trial when all of these things can be done,
however slowly and painfully, by bureaucrats charged with such
responsibility? With regard to the sale of property, since there
is no administrative machinery, cases like Davis will hopefully
open new vistas.
It must be stressed that among the great obstacles to litigation in this area, even more than in other areas, are the excessive costs, the delays, uncertainties, fears and frustrations of all
kinds. Those discriminated against are often the most disadvantaged and the least knowledgeable of the legal options open to
them. It could very well be that there will be no appreciable
amount of litigation in this area until interested and potentially
well-funded organizations take the lead.
It should not be concluded that the failure to use the nondiscrimination provisions of the Illinois Constitution of 1970 proves
that the provisions are ineffective and that all of the effort that
went into them has been futile. We have firmly established a
basic policy for Illinois that in and of itself mandates nondis163. ILL. CoNsT. art. 1, § 12.
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crimination. The new constitutional provisions are not dead letters. Nothing prevents their use. They set a realizable goal of
nondiscrimination in two basic areas--employment and property.
Cases like Davis can be used to make clear the meaning and
utility of section 17. Meanwhile, time, the great ally, will decree
the new day.

